Abstract: We use data on motives of international outsourcing and location choices from a recent survey of European companies to assess the labour market repercussions at home.
1.

Introduction
The labour market repercussions of international outsourcing and offshoring take centre stage in the public debate on globalization. At the same time, the academic debate is far from resolved as the empirical evidence on the employment effects in the home countries of multinational enterprises (MNEs) is still limited and inconclusive. Previous literature focuses on the United States.
1 It is open to question, however, whether findings for the United States hold in Europe. The motives underlying international outsourcing and offshoring may differ, European MNEs may prefer other locations than US peers, and the employment effects may be shaped by labour market rigidities in various continental European home countries.
We draw on a recent survey of European companies conducted by Eurostat (the statistical office of the European Communities), described in more detail in Section 2 below, to assess important aspects of international sourcing that are controversially debated or have received insufficient attention in earlier studies. 2 We use data on job losses and job creation at the sector level in ten European home countries as dependent variables, and the survey results on firms' motives for international sourcing as well as the locations where it takes place as possible determinants of employment effects.
The literature on the coexistence of horizontal and vertical foreign direct investment (FDI) renders theoretical predictions about labour market repercussions in the home market of MNEs rather ambiguous (Becker et al. 2005 ). Horizontal FDI is generally driven by marketseeking motives, while cost-saving motives are underlying vertical FDI. Horizontal FDI could be expected to involve substitution between the firms' foreign and domestic activities in the tradable goods sector. FDI replaces trade in the Heckscher-Ohlin framework so that horizontal FDI would have a negative effect on production (Mundell 1957 ) and thus on employment at home.
By contrast, vertical FDI is often supposed to involve "an element of complementarity between the firm's domestic and foreign operations" (Braconier and Ekholm 2000: 448) .
However, vertical FDI may also involve labour substitution if upstream or downstream 1 Lipsey (2002) provides a comprehensive review of this literature. 2 The term "international sourcing" is used in the following to cover both outsourcing to independent foreign suppliers and offshoring by means of outward FDI. As explained in more detail in Section 2, the survey also covers motives of horizontal FDI; for definitions and coverage of the survey see http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/european_business/special_topics/international_sourcing (accessed: August 2009).
activities traditionally conducted at home are relocated to foreign affiliates. 3 Net effects depend on whether cost savings through vertical fragmentation enable the parent company to improve its productivity and expand its market share, and on the degree of complementarity between foreign and domestic stages of production (Hanson et al. 2005) .
Empirically, the survey by Lipsey (2002: 13) finds "not much evidence for this conjecture [of horizontal FDI substituting for parent activities at home, and vertical FDI adding to parent activities]." Typically it proves fairly "difficult to classify actual foreign operations into these theoretically neat categories" (ibid). We address the classification of international operations as horizontal or vertical in the following by drawing on the Eurostat survey results with respect to the major motives underlying international sourcing by European firms.
Similarly, most existing studies do not distinguish between different locations of foreign operations by MNEs. Yet the relevance of heterogeneous locations is evident from the literature assessing the effects of offshoring on the skill intensity of domestic production. For instance, Head and Ries (2002) find that foreign affiliate employment of Japanese MNEs in low income countries raises the skill intensity at home, while this effect diminishes when FDI is undertaken in higher income countries. The question of whether overall employment effects of outward FDI depend on where foreign affiliates locate has received less attention, and the available evidence is inconclusive.
According to Blomström et al. (1997) , affiliate production in developing countries is negatively associated with parent employment for US-based MNEs, which is attributed to relocation of labour intensive production operations to low wage host countries of US FDI. Harrison et al. (2007) stress the crucial distinction between US affiliates in low income and high income countries, with jobs in low income (high income) countries substituting for (complementing) US jobs. In contrast to the United States, domestic employment (of whitecollar workers) by Swedish MNEs actually increases with more affiliate production in low income countries. 4 Japanese firms resemble Swedish firms in this respect (Lipsey et al. 2000) .
Barba Navaretti et al. (2006) do not find evidence of a negative effect of FDI by French and Italian MNEs in low income countries on economic activity at home.
Inconclusive results are also reported with respect to the employment repercussions of FDI in Central and Eastern Europe as a low wage host region. While Becker et al. (2005) conclude that lower wages in Central and Eastern Europe tend to reduce employment in Germany, Konings and Murphy (2006) With international sourcing being driven at least partly by cost motives and taking place in low wage locations, the labour market repercussions are unlikely to be evenly spread in the home countries of MNEs. Rather, it was widely agreed until recently that mainly low skilled labour would be affected negatively. According to the North-South model of Feenstra and Hanson (1996) , skill intensive headquarter services remain in the more advanced home countries of MNEs and subsidiaries in less advanced host countries draw primarily on less skilled labour. Consequently, offshoring raises the skill premium in the home countries of MNEs. Unemployment of low skilled labour would result if workers resisted widening wage disparity.
5 Baldwin (2006) has challenged this traditional view, arguing that the international division of labour is occurring at a much finer level of disaggregation. MNEs are increasingly offshoring specific tasks that were previously considered non-traded so that "oldglobalisation's correlation between skill groups and winners and losers breaks down" (Baldwin 2006: 5) . More precisely, the fall in communication and coordination costs leads to an unbundling of tasks that no longer stops short of skills. High skilled jobs may be as easily offshored as low skilled jobs if the services they provide do not require physical closeness to where these services are demanded (Blinder 2007) .
The Eurostat survey renders it possible to address the conflicting hypotheses on international sourcing and skills as the employment effects are given not only for the overall workforce of responding firms but also for the high skilled part of the workforce. Moreover, the survey separates between jobs lost due to international sourcing and new jobs created in 5 Feenstra and Hanson (2003) The available survey data are aggregated at the sector level for each of the participating countries. The sector coverage is fairly broad, including essentially all market activities (according to the NACE Rev.1.1 classification). It is not possible, however, to differentiate between specific industries within the manufacturing sector. 9 Taken together, this results in a limited number of observations and constrains the specification of estimation equations (see Section 3 below).
The subsequent analysis focuses on firms' motives for, as well as the location of international sourcing activities as possible determinants of labour market repercussions at home. We are particularly interested in motives related to costs and market access as these are typically regarded to be the driving forces of vertical and horizontal FDI, respectively. As a matter of fact, Alajääskö (2009) lists the reduction of labour costs as the top motive of all sample firms, closely followed by access to new markets. Given that cost reduction other than labour costs is also mentioned to be an important motive by about one third of the sample, we construct a combined cost variable by taking the simple average of the percentage of firms stating reduction of both kinds of costs to be "very important" in their decision to outsource core and support functions.
As concerns locations, international sourcing by European firms is mainly taking place within the EU. As shown in Appendix 2, the average share of firms that source in the relatively advanced EU15-member states is clearly highest (almost 45 percent). By this measure, the less advanced new EU-member states rank second as a location of international sourcing. The average share of firms that source in North America, India and China is considerably smaller (about 6-9 percent). Yet these three locations are expected to offer interesting insights on whether the employment repercussions of international sourcing differ systematically between low and high income host locations.
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Finally, the survey offers sector-specific information on the employment effects of international sourcing. This information is based on the participating firms' own assessment.
More precisely, the firms are requested to provide their best estimate of the number of jobs lost as well as the number of jobs created domestically within the firm as a consequence of international sourcing. Furthermore, the firms are requested to provide the same information 9 Available sectors are as follows: mining and quarrying; manufacturing; electricity, gas and water supply; construction; wholesale and retail trade (including repair); hotels and restaurants; transport and communication; financial intermediation; real estate and business activities. 10 In our estimations, we do not account for other locations than those mentioned in the text. Other locations typically play a minor role (Alajääskö 2009: Figure 4) . Moreover, groups such as "other Asian countries" include both low and high income countries.
separately for high skilled workers. All jobs held by workers with tertiary education are classified as high skilled in the Eurostat survey.
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By relying on the firms' own assessment, the actual impact of international sourcing on employment at home may suffer from measurement error. In particular, responding managers may underrate negative effects in order not to fuel public reservations against international sourcing. However, even if the survey results were generally biased "positively" this would not invalidate our approach of assessing differences in employment repercussions depending on the motives for, and locations of international sourcing. In fact, the subjective assessments of survey respondents may even be preferred over objective employment data.
The latter are often deficient in that it is hardly possible to establish the counterfactual of what would have happened to employment if the firms had not undertaken international sourcing.
By contrast, it appears reasonable to suspect that survey respondents are able to take into account how domestic employment within the firm would possibly have developed without international sourcing. Table 1 presents some stylized facts on job losses as well as job creation due to international sourcing. The sum of job losses reported by all sample firms is about 300.000;
German and UK firms account for almost 80 percent of overall job losses. Relating total job losses to the number of sample firms being engaged in international sourcing results in about 45 jobs lost per firm. Reported job losses per firm are highest in Sweden (about 90), Germany (75) and Denmark (57). The public perception that low skilled workers are more seriously affected finds support as far as absolute numbers can tell: 65-97 percent of total job losses in the sample countries fall into the low skilled category.
Yet the negative employment repercussions of international sourcing appear to be rather modest once it is taken into account that job creation compensates for almost half of job losses reported by survey respondents. The creation of high skilled jobs falls only 14 percent short of losses of high skilled jobs for all countries taken together. 12 For several smaller sample countries, high skilled job creation even exceeds job losses. By contrast, the creation of low skilled jobs accounts for just 35 percent of low skilled jobs lost. Net losses of low skilled jobs are concentrated in Germany, slightly exceeding 30 workers per participating (German) firm with international sourcing.
3.
Method and results
Estimation approach
There are various zero observations for our dependent variables. In the underlying survey it often occurs that responding firms do not consider international outsourcing to have negative employment repercussions for workers with different skills in the home countries. Likewise, job creation is given as zero for several combinations of skill categories, industries and home countries of firms engaged in international outsourcing. We perform standard Tobit estimations to account for this distinguishing feature of the dependent variables; OLS estimations might be biased. By applying Tobit models to the data we assume that the probability of any employment effects as well as the magnitude of employment effects can be explained by the same set of variables. Tobit models also require each explanatory variable to bear the same sign in both instances. We consider both assumptions to be plausible in our estimations.
We estimate Tobit models for each of the following labour market outcomes as The coefficients β (reported in Appendix 4) cannot be interpreted directly in the context of Tobit models. Instead, we are interested in the overall marginal effects of the explanatory variables on ( ) ij ij x y E taking into account the probability that there are any job effects at all.
We calculate them at the mean of the respective covariates (Greene 2003: 764-773) .
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In the following, the dependent variables are always in logs. 14 Motives and location of international sourcing are our explanatory variables of principal interest. In all estimations, we 13 The marginal effects can be interpreted as elasticities when the dependent and independent variables are in logs. We get semi-elasticities when the independent variable is in levels. 14 In order to preserve zero observations we transformed dependent variables according to ) 1 ln( ln y y + = consider two controlling variables: log_nrworkers captures the size of sector i in country j, proxied by the number of full-time equivalent jobs; nrsourcing controls for the level of international sourcing activities in the given sector and country. Furthermore, we include (but do not show) dummies for all home countries and all sectors to control for unobserved heterogeneity in the data. We computed heteroskedasticity robust standard errors for all estimations. Table 2 The two major motives of international sourcing enter significant, but with opposite signs in column (1) for total job losses. Cost reduction as a motive of vertical FDI and outsourcing is associated with total job loss. More precisely, sectors with a higher percentage of firms stating cost reduction to be "very important" for their sourcing decision report significantly more job losses. By contrast, access to new markets as a "very important" motive for locating business functions abroad is associated with a significantly lower number of job losses. Horizontal FDI thus appears to destroy less jobs at home than vertical FDI. This result underscores public concerns about cost-related outsourcing and offshoring. It conflicts, however, with a widely held view in the earlier literature according to which horizontal FDI may have negative employment effects through replacing exports and, thereby, production at home by local production in the host countries. While this reasoning may still apply to horizontal FDI in the tradable goods sector, an increasing share of horizontal FDI takes place in services (UNCTAD 2004).
Outsourcing motives
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While the two major motives have significant effects working into opposite directions with respect to total job losses, they have in common that the effects are quantitatively fairly small. Assuming that the share of firms stating cost motives to be very important would increase by 10 percentage points from its mean of about 44 percent (Appendix 2), job losses would increase by less than 0.2 percent. The same assumption as for the importance of market access would reduce job losses by slightly more than 0.2 percent. Furthermore, job losses may be compensated at least partly by the creation of new jobs through international sourcing. For instance, column (4) in Table 2 indicates that the employment repercussions of cost-oriented international sourcing are not restricted to job destruction, even though the effect on job creation remains statistically insignificant at conventional levels. This provides weak support for the view that international sourcing increases the competiveness of firms which, in turn, may generate new employment opportunities (e.g. Marin 2004 ).
Columns (3) and (6) in Table 2 reveal that the results for the overall workforce reported so far are mainly driven by job losses of low skilled workers. As before, job losses rise with an increasing share of firms stating cost motives to be very important, and a predominance of market access motives tends to reduce job losses. The quantitative effects, though still modest, are somewhat larger than for total job losses.
The pattern of job losses and job creation for high skilled workers differs in several respects from the pattern for low skilled workers. Cost-related motives do not impact significantly either job losses or job creation for high skilled workers. In other words, skills still appear to matter for the employment repercussions of cost-driven international sourcing.
This qualifies the view that high skilled jobs may be as easily offshored as low skilled jobs in the current phase of globalization. Possibly, the unbundling of tasks according to Baldwin (2006) is a fairly recent phenomenon not yet captured in the data used here.
More strikingly, the results in column (2) indicate that job losses for high skilled workers are higher in sectors and countries where more firms rate market access motives to be very important. This effect is significant at the one percent level. However, the quantitative impact is once again fairly modest. Furthermore, the results in column (5) suggest that horizontal FDI also has significant potential to create new high skilled jobs in a particular sector of a country. The finding that market-related motives are significantly associated with both job losses and job creation for high skilled workers gains plausibility when more closely inspecting the underlying data for the biggest economy in the sample, Germany. The number of high skilled jobs lost in Germany is only seven percent higher than the number of high skilled jobs created (Table 1 ). The pattern of high skilled job creation deviating just slightly from job losses holds for almost all German sectors. At the same time, the average share of German firms rating market access to be "very important" for their sourcing decisions is far above average (65 percent compared to 46 percent).
Taken together, the findings reported in Table 2 invite some tentative conclusions. The employment repercussions of international sourcing clearly differ between high skilled and low skilled workers, even though quantitative effects are generally modest. High skilled workers do not necessarily suffer less job losses under all circumstances. However, compensating shifts in employment within skill categories are particularly pronounced for high skilled workers, indicating that these workers have better chances to find new jobs.
Location choice
As noted in the Introduction, the public is primarily concerned about outsourcing and offshoring to low wage locations such as China, India and the new EU-member states.
Therefore, we separate high from low wage countries in order to test whether the labour market repercussions differ significantly between these groups. High wage is defined as the average share of firms that reported to invest in either North America (i.e., Canada and the Strikingly, the distinction between low and high wage locations does not matter for job losses. This is in contrast to previous findings for the United States (Blomström et al. 1997; Harrison et al. 2007 ). Moreover, this result applies irrespectively of the skill category of workers (columns (1) to (3)). As for job creation (column (4)) we even find that international sourcing in high wage locations is associated with less job creation. The negative and significant effect on total job creation can be attributed exclusively to low skilled workers.
While blue-collar workers appear to suffer from the replacement of previous exports by local production in advanced host countries, white-collar workers may be less affected as long as headquarter services remain in the home country.
Having found no significant employment effects of international sourcing in all low wage countries taken together, we refine the dichotomy between low and high wage countries.
Arguably, this dichotomy hides substantial heterogeneity within both groups. Hence, we differentiate between specific regions and major host countries in the following. The Eurostat survey enables us to distinguish three important low wage locations, i.e., China, India, and the twelve new EU members, and two high wage locations, i.e., North America and the EU15. As before, we control for sector size and the overall level of sourcing in the sector. The results presented in Table 4 reveal that there are indeed different effects within the low income and the high income group, respectively.
As for high wage locations it is mainly the EU15 that accounts for two previous findings. Similar to Table 3 , international sourcing within the EU15 has a significantly negative effect on job creation for low skilled workers -and this effect again carries over to total job creation (columns (6) and (4) in Table 4 ). Furthermore, column (2) shows higher job losses for high skilled workers due to sourcing within the EU15, resembling the previous finding for market-related motives in Table 2 By contrast, the employment repercussions of international sourcing in similarly advanced, but more distant locations are more benign. Specifically, there is no evidence that sourcing in North America is associated significantly with higher job losses or less job creation for any skill category. This may be partly because sourcing in North America plays a minor role compared to sourcing within the EU15 (see Section 2). In addition, the motives underlying sourcing in North America may extend beyond the conventional horizontal versus vertical divide. For instance, some European FDI in the United States is driven by considerations of access to advanced technologies. 17 This could explain why the marginal effect on job losses for high skilled workers is negative, in contrast to the corresponding effect of sourcing in the EU15, and almost significant at the ten percent level.
While the marginal effects differ between the economically advanced EU15 and North America, the marginal effects reported in Table 4 are strikingly similar when comparing the more advanced EU15 with the less advanced new EU members. As observed earlier for the EU15, sourcing in the new member states is associated with higher job losses for high skilled workers and less job creation for low skilled workers. 18 The observation that high skilled The results for China and India underscore that it is misleading to assess the labour market repercussions of international sourcing along the simple divide of low versus high wage locations. The results on job losses shown in columns (1) to (3) of Table 4 suggest that the case of India fits best into the widely held view of international sourcing causing job losses for low skilled workers, whereas high skilled workers may benefit from improved competitiveness of companies realizing cost savings through outsourcing and offshoring.
Indeed, the marginal effect in column (3), though still modest, is considerably higher than marginal effects found before. Accordingly, an increase by ten percentage points in the share of firms with sourcing in India would add 1.5 percent to low skilled job losses. Nevertheless, even sourcing in India does not have the one-sided negative effects as often perceived in the public debate. Job losses for low skilled workers are at least partly compensated by job creation. Hence, sourcing in India seems to involve employment shifts within the low skilled workforce. For instance, sourcing of routine ICT services in India may enhance the competitiveness of operations at home and, thereby, generate additional low skilled jobs performing tasks that require close personal contacts.
Compared to India, the employment effects of sourcing in China are much weaker for low skilled workers, while similarly favourable for high skilled workers. 19 Obviously, both
China and India have a vast endowment of cheap labour that may affect low skilled labour in more advanced countries. All the same, there are important differences between the two low wage locations. For instance, India remained largely closed to low-tech and local marketoriented FDI until recently (Görg et al. 2009 ). By contrast, the public perception of China often neglects that FDI has helped penetrate local Chinese markets. According to Whalley and Xin (2006) , FDI flows to China from Western Europe (and North America) were mainly of the horizontal type. Taking further into account that many Chinese markets were protected against imports, horizontal FDI was unlikely to replace previous exports and, thereby, have adverse labour market effects at home.
Net effects
We estimated separate Tobit models for job losses and job creation so far. This was meant to fully exploit the available information from the Eurostat survey. In the final step of our analysis, we attempt to capture net employment effects of outsourcing motives and location choices, by re-estimating the Tobit models with the difference between job losses and job creation as dependent variables. This meets with two problems that render the subsequent results rather tentative. First, we are left with less uncensored observations than before. The difference between jobs lost and jobs created is sometimes negative so that, in order not to completely ignore these observations, we treat them as zero observations. 20 Second, as mentioned in Section 2, it is mainly for skilled workers that jobs lost are often less than jobs created. As a consequence, it proved impossible to re-estimate the Tobit models with net job losses for high skilled workers.
Keeping these limitations in mind, several of our previous findings turn out to be fairly robust when redefining the dependent variables as such described. As for the overall marginal effects reported in columns (1) and (3) of Table 5 , it still holds that the employment repercussions are more benign when international sourcing is motivated by market access considerations. Also in line with previous results, it is for low skilled labour that horizontal FDI tends to destroy less jobs at home than vertical FDI. This remains true even though cost reduction as a motive for vertical FDI and outsourcing is no longer associated in a significant way with more job losses for either all workers or low skilled workers. The latter result is not surprising recalling that gross job losses are compensated at least partly by the creation of new jobs due to cost savings and improved competitiveness achieved through international sourcing.
It also holds that the employment effects differ strikingly between locations that are similarly advanced economically. The differences between India and China are hardly affected when assessing net employment effects. Moreover, we still find no adverse labour market repercussions of sourcing in North America. On the other hand, the employment effects once again turn out to be fairly similar within Europe, even though the EU15 members are, on average, considerably more advanced than the new EU members. In the case of the new members, however, the marginal effects are now insignificant for all workers as well as for low skilled workers. Sourcing within the EU15 is significantly associated with net job 20 More precisely, we set all negative and zero observations to one and subsequently take natural logs.
losses in both estimations at the five percent level. Taken together, this provides even less reason to blame sourcing in low wage Europe for labour market problems at home.
Summary and conclusion
Drawing on a recent survey of European companies, we use data on job losses and job creation at the sector level in ten European home countries to evaluate the labour market repercussions of international sourcing. In particular, we analyze whether employment effects depend on the motives underlying international sourcing as well as the location where it takes place. This allows us to assess the widespread public concern about adverse employment effects resulting primarily from cost-saving sourcing in low wage countries.
By performing Tobit estimations, we find some support for this view insofar as the employment repercussions at home tend to be more benign when access to new markets is the motive for locating business functions abroad. However, the quantitative impact on job losses remains modest even in the case of cost-saving motives. Furthermore, in sharp contrast to public fears, the dichotomy between low and high wage locations does not offer meaningful insights into the employment effects of international sourcing.
This simple divide hides substantial heterogeneity within both groups of countries.
The employment implications of relocating business functions differ between low wage countries such as China and India hosting a specific mix of sourcing activities. Sourcing in North America stands out among high wage locations for the absence of adverse employment effects, which can be attributed to technology-related sourcing activities. In the European context, it appears to be strongly misleading to contrast low wage EU accession states with high wage EU15 members, and blaming the former for job losses in the latter. Sourcing in both groups has strikingly similar effects as new and old EU members often attract horizontal as well as vertical FDI. Moreover, high as well as low skilled workers are affected by sourcing within the EU, though employment repercussions are again modest in quantitative terms.
It also turns out that job losses are typically compensated at least partly by the creation of new jobs. International sourcing involves considerable shifts in employment within specific skill categories. This applies especially to high skilled workers. In other respects, too, we find that skills still matter for employment repercussions in the current phase of globalization. In particular, our results qualify the view that high skilled jobs may be as easily offshored as low skilled jobs.
To derive more specific policy conclusions it would be highly desirable if Eurostat released the firm-specific survey results. This could be done in an anonymous form to maintain confidentiality of participating firms. The availability of firm-specific data would allow for refined specifications of the estimation equations presently prevented by the limited number of observations at the sector level. constant -19.3*** -19.1*** -33.4*** -37.5*** -11.7*** -17.4*** -27.2*** -29.4*** -24.8*** -27.2*** -31.2*** -17.5*** -64.8*** -72.0*** -62.2*** -71.8*** (-2.360) (-2.852) (-9.534) (-7.287) (-1.070) (-1.849) (-3.339) (-4.843) (-3.534) (-3.913 
